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through an examination of Sunstein’s Choosing Not to Choose which uses nudge policy in the
form of default rules to advance a different conception of freedom than standard choice theory
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Behavioral economics’ use of the positive-normative distinction

There is considerable debate about the differences between behavioral economics, as understood
by followers of prospect theory, and standard rational choice theory, but one of the main
differences between them has been framed in a methodological way in terms of the idea of
descriptive adequacy, where the meaning of this idea draws on the positive-normative distinction
(or the descriptive-normative distinction). From the perspective of behavioral economics, then,
rational choice theory is regarded as a normative theory because it explains how agents ought to
behave in order to be rational, whereas behavioral economics is regarded as a positive theory
because it describes how agents actually behave. In his Nobel lecture, Daniel Kahneman made
this a salient difference, and consequently drew a hard line between behavioral economics and
rational choice theory.
One novelty of prospect theory was that it was explicitly presented as a formal descriptive
theory of the choices that people actually make, not as a normative model. This was a
departure from a long history of choice models that served double duty as normative logics
and as idealized descriptive models (2003, 1456).
For behavioral economists who follow Kahneman, then, rational choice theory is descriptively
inadequate because it is normative, and behavioral economics is descriptively adequate because
it is positive or non-normative (see Hands, 2015; Heukelom, 2014, 62-6).
Yet how the positive-normative distinction is being used here is somewhat different from how that
distinction has traditionally been used in economics. Consider the understanding of the positivenormative distinction in economics derived from Lionel Robbins and still held by many
economists (Robbins, 1932). The distinction involves two main ideas in Robbins’ view, one
regarding language and another regarding the relationship between science and ethics (Hands,
2012; Davis, 2015). The first idea – derived from David Hume’s is-ought distinction – is that there
is a fundamental difference between statements or claims using ‘is’ language that are positive and
value-free and statements or claims using ‘ought’ language that express values, whether explicitly
or implicitly. The second idea is that purpose of the positive-normative distinction is to draw a
hard line between a value-free, scientific economics and an unscientific economics in service to
ethics. To say, then, that rational choice theory is normative because it explains how agents ought
to behave if they are to be rational appears to invoke the first idea, because a descriptively
adequate science is not one that formulated in terms of ‘ought’ language but rather one that is
formulated in terms of ‘is’ language.
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But Robbins’ second idea is not part of behavioral economists’ criticism of rational choice theory.
The reason rational choice theory is regarded as normative by behavioral economists it that its
axiomatic requirements regarding preferences determine how agents ought to behave in order to
be rational, not because it contains any implicit ethical reasoning (Hands, 2015, 6-7). Thus
behavioral economists do not claim that rational choice theory falls on the wrong side Robbins’
line dividing a value-free, scientific economics from an unscientific economics in service to ethics.
At the same time, there is no evidence that behavioral economists reject Robbins’ second idea,
and good reason to suppose that they accept it since the ideal of a ‘descriptively adequate science’
is a science that is presumably value-free in the sense of not employing ethical values.1
Summarizing their use of the positive-normative distinction, behavioral economists:
(i)

use the distinction to criticize the method of explanation rational choice theory
employs

(ii)

restrict their criticism of rational choice theory as normative to its implicit recourse
to ought language

(iii)

accept Robbins’ distinction between value-free science and value-laden non-science

(iv)

place both behavioral economics and rational choice theory on the side of value-free
science.

The only issue, then, that seems to separate behavioral economics and rational choice theory is
how descriptively inadequate rational choice theory is, since behavioral economists allow that
sometimes rational choice theory predicts well even if they believe that it generally fails to predict
well. Indeed, much of the debate over the merits of behavioral economics versus standard rational
choice theory comes down to a debate over whether empirical evidence, especially from
experiments, supports one approach or the other.2 This, however, has little to do with the charge
that rational choice theory is normative, and rather reflects a dispute over the relative merits of
top-down axiomatic methods versus bottom-up more empirical methods (or as Kahneman put it,
a “formal descriptive theory” approach) in regard to which is likely to generate more descriptively
adequate results.
This conclusion, then, clearly does not square very well with behavioral economics’ claim that
what distinguishes behavioral economics from rational choice theory is that the latter is

‘Methodological’ values, however, such as a preference for mathematical expression and the importance
empirical testing, are acceptable values in a positivist conception of science, including for Robbins.
2 And it is not just behavioral economists who challenge the descriptive adequacy of rational choice theory.
Harrison and Swartout, for example, argue, in defense of rational choice theory, that in various respects
behavioral economics is empirically weak and does not predict very well (Harrison and Swartout, 2014).
1
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normative. Moreover, while rational choice theory can indeed be interpreted as employing ought
language, this charge is also rather easily answered by rational choice theorists who can argue that
if people are generally rational, then the behavior they describe is only what economists should
typically expect to find, not behavior that they recommend agents ought to adopt (see Ross, 2005,
91).3 From this perspective, the charge that rational choice theory is implicitly normative rests on
a confusion regarding the interpretation of ought language. Contrary to Hume, ought language is
not always used in a normative way, since saying ‘we should expect to find such and such behavior’
is a descriptive statement that rather uses ‘should’ in a non-normative probabilistic way. So while
it can indeed be said that rational choice theory explains how agents ought to behave in order to
be rational, what this means is that this is what we ought to expect of people who are generally
rational, and thus does not mean that means rational choice theory is normative in the ethics
sense that Robbins objected to.
What conclusions can we draw from this? I suggest there are four. First, behavioral economists
who make this claim are apparently confused about what saying something is normative means.
Second, it follows that they also do not seem to have a clear understanding of what the positivenormative distinction (or the descriptive-normative distinction) involves, as most economists
following Robbins understand it. Third, it then follows from this that they are also unclear about
what the distinction between value-free science and value-laden non-science involves, as shown
by their placing rational choice theory on the on the side of value-free science while
simultaneously declaring it to be a normative theory. Fourth, what behavioral economists
however seem to be clear about is, as noted, that they regard rational choice theory as
‘descriptively inadequate.’
I propose, then, the following interpretation of behavioral economics’ critique of rational choice
theory and understanding of the positive-normative distinction. On the one hand, behavioral
economists (and also many rational choice economists for that matter) seem to be generally
unaware of philosopher Hilary Putnam’s ‘entanglement’ thesis regarding the positive-normative
distinction – also understood as the fact-value dichotomy (Putnam, 2002). Putnam argues that
the idea that science can be value-free, where it is ethical values and not just methodological
values that are at issue, or Robbins’ second idea, is simply wrong. Facts and values and science
and ethics are inescapably ‘entangled’ with one another. I will not review Putnam’s arguments
here (but see Davis, 2015), though in outline they operate on two levels: language in science
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Indeed, using evolutionary reasoning, they could also argue that rational behavior is what economic agents
would adopt.
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cannot be clearly parsed into descriptive and value-laden language, as Hume mistakenly claimed;
and values, ethical and methodological, often operate in science behind the scenes as it were in
many ways that influence scientists’ descriptions of the phenomena. I would only add to this that
this seems more clearly so in social science.
On the other hand, then, I hypothesize – accepting Putnam’s idea that science is not value-free –
that behavioral economists’ real complaint against rational choice theory when they charge that
it is descriptively inadequate is that they do not accept the implicit value basis that rational choice
theory employs and rather prefer a different value basis. Here by value basis I am specifically
referring to ethical values. That is, I suggest that although behavioral economists put both
themselves and rational choice theory on the same side of Robbins’ divide between value-free
science and value-laden non-science, if we take Putnam to be right that this divide does not exist,
then behavioral economics’ real complaint is that rational choice theory is descriptively
inadequate because it promotes the wrong ethics/value-laden science. In effect, it mis-describes
the values underlying economists’ explanation of choice behavior.
This conclusion, needless to say, is not a straightforward one to defend because it requires
interpreting behavioral economics’ research program in a manner contrary to how most
behavioral economists interpret it. Nonetheless, I believe that there exists a reasonable way to
proceed with this argument, namely, by examining the assumptions behind behavioral economics’
nudge initiative in relation to its explanation of behavior (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The nudge
initiative is a new policy recommendation framework that shares rational choice theory’s position
that economic policy should be welfare increasing in the Pareto sense. It also shares with rational
choice theory the idea that economic policy works through how it influences individual behavior.
This is important because it means that the effectiveness of nudge policy ultimately is connected
to how one describes individuals and their behavior, and this link, between policy goals and
explanations of behavior, gives us one way of seeing how purportedly positive descriptions of
economic behavior can be value-laden. Consequently, I will argue in the next section that how
behavioral economists explain behavior depends on how nudges are thought to be effective,
thereby making those explanations value-laden.
To make this argument in any kind of comprehensive way would require a full review of the nudge
literature, which is beyond what a single paper can achieve. Thus, here I only examine the most
recent, and in my view most sophisticated statement of the nudge view, namely Cass Sunstein’s
Choosing Not to Choose discussion of default rules (Sunstein, 2015). I will argue that what is
important about nudge arguments for him are both their descriptive superiority to rational choice
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arguments – thus supporting behavioral economics’ main charge – and also their superior ethical
foundation – an implicit rejection of behavioral economics’ general commitment to the idea of a
value-free science but a fulfillment of what I treat as its implicit aims in advancing an alternative
ethics conception of economics.
Section 2 discusses what would be required in Robbins’ terms to keep descriptive explanations of
behavior free of their associated ethics of policy recommendation, shows why behavioral
economics nudge view of policy recommendation undermines this separation, and then
distinguishes two different views of freedom that rational choice theory and behavioral economics
each promote. Section 3 turns to Sunstein’s Choosing Not to Choose discussion of default rules,
his main interpretation of nudges, links this to his view of how he believes the nature and scope
of freedom can be increased, and explains this in terms of his understanding of the relationship
between markets and government.

Section 4 discusses how the emergence of behavioral

economics gives us a new understanding of what economics imperialism involves. I note that the
standard view of economics imperialism presupposes Robbins’ divide between science and ethics,
and then argue that since this divide is more nominal than real for behavioral economists,
economics imperialism is fundamentally normative in nature.

The argument is applied to

behavioral development economics. Section 5 makes brief concluding remarks about economics’
status and relation to the other social sciences in light of the debate between standard rational
choice theory and behavioral economics.

2

The nudge intervention

There are different ways in which ethical values can enter into explanations claimed to be valuefree. For example, for Putnam descriptive terms often express values, as in his case of the word
‘cruel’ (Putnam, 2002, 24ff). Here, however, in order to make an initial comparison between
rational choice theory and behavioral economics, I first focus on the relationships between values
present in policy recommendations and explanations of choice behavior, and then use this
comparison to move on to the larger question of how values directly enter into their purportedly
positive explanations in both rational choice theory and behavioral economics. In the case of the
normative influence of policy recommendations on explanations, then, my argument is that the
latter are value-laden when they are framed by the values of present underlying the former. Both
behavioral economics and rational choice theory employ Pareto judgments to make policy
recommendations. However, in contrast to rational choice theory, nudge policies require a
specific explanation of individual behavior if nudges are to be effective. So in this respect welfare
6

as a value enters indirectly into behavioral economic explanations in a way that it does not in the
case of rational choice theory.4
Consider first standard rational choice theory. It seems fair to say that its explanation of choice
behavior is value-free in regard to its policy recommendations in that the way in which the theory
explains choice does not depend on the values underlying the policy recommendations it makes
using the Pareto criterion. The Pareto criterion merely recommends that states of affairs in which
some individuals’ preferences are further satisfied and no individuals’ preferences are less
satisfied. Whether individuals’ preferences are more or less satisfied, however, implies nothing
about how individuals’ choices are explained in terms of their preferences. Rather, the influence
runs in the opposite direction. The Pareto criterion is of course formulated in terms of the
preference concept, but that reflects its dependence on the standard explanation of choice, not
the reverse. Consequently, in the case of standard rational choice theory Robbins’ firewall
between recommendation and explanation is maintained, at least in regard to a possible influence
of the former on the latter.
Compare this with behavioral economics’ nudge view of policy.

The Pareto criterion is also

employed for policy recommendation, but its satisfaction now depends on how individuals’
choices are changed by choice architects who as policy-makers are able to alter the circumstances
of choice. The idea that policy-makers are able to alter the choices individuals make, of course, is
based on behavioral economics’ view that individuals suffer various psychological biases that
cause them to make choices they would not make if they did not suffer these biases. Nudges
accordingly make it possible for individuals to make the choices that they would make absent
these biases, so that by offsetting these biases it is possible to effectively apply the Pareto
criterion.5 Thus the nudge interpretation of the Pareto criterion implies a certain description and
explanation of behavior. When people suffer psychological biases, their welfare is lower. So this
psychological analysis is based on the welfare concept. But this removes Robbins’ firewall
between recommendation and explanation since the normative goal, fulfilling the Pareto
criterion, now underlies the explanation of behavior, so that description and recommendation are
not independent of one another, and the explanation and description of individual behavior
becomes value-laden.

For a review of the degree to which behavioral economics has influenced economic policy, see Geiger
(2016).
5 See Grűne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2016) for a distinction between nudges and boosts as two forms of policy
intervention.
4
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Given this, it seems that it is rather behavioral economics that is normative, not standard rational
choice theory as behavioral economists claim. Yet at the same time, behavioral economics’
companion claim that it is descriptively more adequate still seems credible, since the idea that
people suffer psychological biases seems to provide a more realistic account of choice behavior
than rational choice explanations that neglect human psychology. Note, then, that ironically this
apparent greater realism is tied to how behavioral economists’ Pareto policy recommendations
transfer welfare values to their explanations of behavior. Specifically, in order to make their
Pareto recommendations behavioral economists engage in counterfactual reasoning about choice
behavior by describing it in terms of the choices that people would make were choice architects
able to change their circumstances of choice. In contrast, rational choice theory, particularly in
the form of revealed preference analysis, avoids counterfactual analysis by simply recording what
choices individuals are revealed to make. It is behavioral economics’ counterfactual analysis
explanation of choice behavior, motivated by its presumed extension of Pareto welfare reasoning,
that consequently provides both its claimed greater realism about behavior and generates its
value-laden explanations of that behavior. In effect, what would be the case is determined by
what should be the case when choice architects design nudge policies.
Perhaps this seems paradoxical. Let me then recast this argument about how values influence
descriptions in much broader terms than the restrictive focus I adopted above regarding whether
values involved in policy recommendation influence descriptions. On the surface of things, then,
it is behavioral economics’ introduction of counterfactual reasoning about behavior that breaks
down Robbins’ firewall, but in broader terms what that reasoning does is invoke a more nuanced
conception of freedom of choice than standard rational choice theory employs. In standard
rational choice theory, individuals, on their own, either make choices or do not when prices or
other exogenous factors change the circumstances of choice. In behavioral economics, however,
additional factors influence freedom of choice since choice architects’ design of the circumstances
of choice allows individuals to make choices that they otherwise would not make. In effect,
behavioral economics introduces a form of social interaction between choice architects and people
making choices that is meant to work in such a way as to increase individual freedom. This
obviously complicates the idea of free choice as traditionally understood in rational choice theory,
as demonstrated by the debate over whether libertarian paternalism, the label nudge policy
initially had, is an oxymoron (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Thus, behind the issue of how the
value basis in policy recommendation is transferred to behavioral economics’ description of
behavior lies a much larger issue of what freedom of choice involves that occupies both standard
rational choice theory and behavioral economics.
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From this perspective, that behavioral economics’ counterfactual analysis explanation of choice
behavior produces both an arguably more realistic explanation of behavior and also generates its
value-laden explanations of that behavior is less paradoxical than it may seem. As a concept, free
choice, as Putnam would argue, has both descriptive and normative dimensions, such that we
cannot understand the concept without understanding the role each plays. We describe how
people make choices and simultaneously value those choices to the extent we believe that they
stem from what people freely want.

Thus, behavioral economics, because it employs

counterfactual reasoning in its characterization of behavior, makes this larger value issue
regarding what freedom involves central to that characterization. So it is ultimately the valueladenness of behavioral economics’ explanations of behavior in regard to the nature of free choice
that lies at the root of those explanations, not just in how its treatment of Pareto recommendations
influences those explanations.
The opposition between standard rational choice theory and behavioral economics, then, is not
just a matter of which approach is ‘descriptively’ more adequate, despite what behavioral
economists claim. It is also, or perhaps primarily, a matter of which view of freedom of choice is
normatively more adequate (cf. Ballet et al., 2014). From this it follows that both approaches are
value-laden because they both advance explanations of behavior that depend on valuing freedom
of choice. That is, both make the value of freedom, as they each interpret it, central to their
descriptions of behavior. In the next section, then, I argue that ultimately the position of
behavioral economists is that behavioral economics’ ‘descriptive’ superiority to rational choice
explanations is a matter of its superior normative foundation in regard to explaining freedom of
choice – or that the ‘descriptive’ inadequacy of rational choice theory is for them due to its weaker
explanation of freedom of choice. Both approaches, therefore, fall on the wrong side of Robbins’s
divide, but in fact the real message here regarding the positive-normative distinction – following
Putnam – is that for both Robbins was wrong, even if lip service is paid to him, and the central
issue is which approach has the better value-laden explanation of behavior. To make this
argument, I take Sunstein as a key figure for behavioral economics in virtue of his articulation of
the scope and nature of freedom when nudge policy is formulated in terms of the idea of
‘defaulting’ one’s choices to others.

3

Choosing Not to Choose

Sunstein is an interesting contributor to behavioral economics because he was trained in law, has
worked in government, and is not an economist. This suggests that he lacks the professional
9

blinders that most economists exhibit regarding the positive-normative distinction and the role
ethical values play in economics and science, and that he is intent in an unencumbered way on
advancing a policy framework that he believes would be valuable to society today. At the same
time, Sunstein’s collaboration with Richard Thaler (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008) established
for him the basic logic of nudge policy in identifying circumstances in which individuals are put
in the position of opting-in or out of choices constructed for them by choice architects, or as he
explains it in Choosing Not to Choose, of adopting default rules whereby one chooses to have
others make one’s choices. Default rules, then – and the emphasis is on rules – are an extension
of the basic nudge idea. Indeed, for Sunstein they “count as prime ‘nudges,’ understood as
interventions that maintain freedom of choice, that do not impose mandates or bans, but that
nonetheless incline people’s choices in a particular direction” (Sunstein, 2015, 6). There is a
further difference. Whereas nudges are formulated mostly in terms of the behavior of choice
architects, and the people affected by them are often passive (and can even be unaware of them),
default rules address how people authorize choice architects’ nudges, and thus raise fundamental
issues regarding the social basis of individual freedom. Consider, then, how nudge policy in the
form of default rules changes the interpretation of people’s choices.
On the surface, it might seem that making a choice whose alternatives have been structured by
choice architects is little different from how choice is explained in standard rational choice theory.
The individual still has freedom of choice and still seeks to optimize even if the choice setting has
been designed by a choice architect. But for Sunstein thinking in this way overlooks the potential
large-scale positive effects on freedom associated with what happens when we systematically
apply nudge policy throughout economic life. When nudge policy is applied generally, it does not
just tip a collection of isolated choices in ways that individuals would prefer were they able to see
beyond their psychological biases – as in the example of where healthy foods are placed in the
cafeteria line. Rather, adopting nudge policy is a matter of promoting an entire system of default
rules throughout society whereby individuals can opt out of choices, ‘choosing not to choose,’ or
more accurately choosing to have others choose for them, in order to expand, not contract, their
freedom, and thereby extend the reach of their choices beyond their own expertise and abilities
by exploiting the social division of labor. The proper example here is having new employees
defaulted into basic pension plans, a policy that extends freedom through their reliance on the
expertise of others, increases their choices in retirement via their higher incomes, and improves
general well-being by reducing the burden on society of poverty among the elderly.
Establishing a system of default rules, then, might be seen as using economic policy to establish a
more far-reaching principal-agent system. But it also is different in that on the standard view
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principal-agent relationships are formed between fully rational individuals able to appraise their
benefits and costs, whereas what Sunstein imagines is a world in which individuals are often less
than rational but still rational enough to favor a system in which third party, choice architect
policy-makers design systems of utility-enhancing default rules for large numbers of people. One
way of putting this is to say that what Sunstein, with his non-economist, legal background, is more
interested in is a better system of government rather than in producing more efficient markets.
Whereas economists usually see the locus of policy as targeting how markets work, people trained
in law are often more worried about the representative character of government authority.
Indeed, this means they are concerned with the role of third parties in market systems in a way
that economists are not.
Market transactions, of course, are essentially two-party transactions, and third-parties are often
associated with transaction spillovers or externalities. For Sunstein, this has things upside down
since having choice architects create default rules gives third parties a role in making two-party
transactions more successful. In contrast, standard economists are likely to see the third-party
role of choice architects as interfering in the market and nudge policy as thus paternalist. For
them, nudge policy is indeed an oxymoron, because it both aims to promote freedom while
simultaneously undermining by interfering in market transactions. Thus economists with their
focus on the logic of markets and Sunstein with his law/government frame are unlikely to find
common ground in any debate over the nature of freedom. This then provides one explanation of
why the debate between the two sides has rather settled on a disagreement over how rational they
each think people are – the descriptive adequacy issue. Rational choice theorists believe people
are basically rational. It would follow from this that system of default rules based on third-party
interventions in two-party transactions is paternalist. Behavioral economists take psychology
seriously, and believe that people are not always rational. It would follow from this that they see
a system of default rules as enhancing freedom and welfare. Thus rationality is the immediate
entry point when one focuses on the market and the other on government, but what really
distinguishes their view is their different normative visions regarding what freedom involves.
Stepping back to take a wider view, that a debate over the nature of freedom seems to have been
deflected into a debate over how rational people are also reflects how two different science-public
policy constituencies have lined up against each another to defend their respective visions of
society: traditional economists on the one hand and an alliance of psychologists and people from
law and government like Sunstein on the other. The former, since the time of Adam Smith, have
generally been skeptical of the reach of government, and see the market as the principle means of
securing freedom. This accordingly requires that we see people as essentially rational. The latter,
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are inclined to see government as benevolent, and able to promote forms of freedom beyond what
markets produce.

This accordingly requires a more complex view of freedom built on a

relationship between markets and government. As if to meet this issue head on, Sunstein
expresses his view of the opposition between these two normative visions quite clearly in his
opening remarks in Choosing Not to Choose:
Is the rise of personalized default rules a blessing or a curse? Short answer: Blessing. Is
it a utopian or dystopian vision? Short answer: Utopian. But no short answer is sufficient.
This book offers a framework with which to answer these questions. I am going to
celebrate default rules (mostly), and remark on their contribution to human freedom
(Sunstein, xiii).
That is, with his book’s framework he not only intends to make the positive case for nudges and
defaults but also for his vision of a society. However, this will not likely satisfy those critics who
do not share his optimism. Yet neither is it likely that the empirical evidence economists and
psychologists may be able to produce regarding choice behavior will demonstrate to one side or
the other the superiority of behavioral economics over standard rational choice theory – or the
reverse. Indeed, from a methodological point of view and in the history of science empirical
evidence has rarely been sufficient by itself to show one theory superior to another. I suggest that
this is especially the case in social science when theories may also differ in their normative
foundations.
Thus, despite behavioral economics’ charge that rational choice theory is descriptively
inadequate, what its main complaint seems to be is that it is normatively inadequate. At the same
time, rational choice theory’s opposition to behavioral economics may have less to do with its
analysis of rationality and more to do with rejecting the latter’s normative vision in favor of its
own. Yet both approaches still nominally subscribe to Robbins’ view that economics should be
value-free. In part this can be ascribed to their failure to understand the positive-normative
distinction and the ‘entanglement’ of facts and values. But it might also be ascribed to the
widespread view that science needs to be ‘objective’ coupled with an equally widely held view that
ethics is subjective. So irrespective of their clear concern with the nature of freedom, both appear
committed to arguing their cases in conventional terms that mislead us about their deeper basis
for disagreement. This inversion, then, only becomes clear, by accident as it were, when a noneconomist lacking the positivistic instincts of an economist makes a defense of behavioral
economics around nudge policy, which is decidedly all about expanding freedom.
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4

Behavioral economics imperialism

In this section, I try to say what the emergence of behavioral economics – the produce of a reverse
imperialism of psychology towards economics – might generally tell us about economics
imperialism. Science imperialism, then, concerns the status of sciences as relatively independent
domains of investigation, and how the expansion of a science might influence other sciences.
Economics imperialism in particular is usually understood to be a matter of economics’ export of
its distinctive approach as a social science to other social sciences (Mäki, 2008). What is often
taken as ‘distinctive’ of economics’ approach, then, are its main methods and concepts, in
particular: optimization analysis and equilibrium theory; efficiency and competition between
atomistic agents.

While these ideas are certainly characteristic of economics’ distinctive

approach, an economics imperialism framed in these terms ignores the normative dimensions of
economics imperialism associated with economics’ ethical vision of society, and thus how that
vision may be promoted along with its distinctive approach.
At the same time, this neglect is what one would expect under the influence of Robbins’ dichtomy
between science and ethics. Indeed, following Robbins, what an imperialistic economics should
be thought to offer to other social sciences is an approach that maintains a clear line between
positive and normative analysis. Further, if this line does not appear to be well observed in other
social sciences, emphasis on this dividing line would be a part of what would then justify an
economics imperialism in terms of its ‘distinctive’ approach. That is, central to economics’ own
conception of economics imperialism is the idea that economics is a positive science.
The argument in the sections above, however, is that economics only pays lip service to Robbins’
dichtomy, and in fact both standard rational choice theory and behavioral economics are engaged
in a debate over the nature and scope of freedom in economics’ implicit normative vision. So
contrary to the view that economics imperialism is a positivist project built around the Robbins
doctrine, I argue that economics imperialism is pre-eminently a normative project that promotes
the main ethical values traditionally associated with economics, and that a behavioral economics
imperialism in particular is all about promoting its interpretation of those values.
Previously, I discussed behavioral economics imperialism in connection with development
economics – a behavioral development economics imperialism – arguing that the use of the
Kahneman-Tversky heuristics and biases framework to explain behavior in developing economy
societies has produced economic explanations of many non-market dimensions of life in those
societies, thus causing behavioral development economics to function as a new kind of economics
imperialism (Davis, 2013). Indeed, as such a behavioral development economics imperialism is
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also as a conventional social and cultural imperialism, or perhaps a western social science
imperialism under the leadership of an economics expanded by its adoption of psychology.
Consider, for example, the research investigating how people might be encouraged to buy bed
nets, which are used to combat malaria (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). For a variety of reasons
associated with traditional ways of life, people in developing societies often do not make good use
of bed nets, even when they cost very little. At issue for behavioral development economists, then,
is whether people’s choices can be influenced by how market prices for bed nets are set. Should
prices be high to signal their value? Low to make them affordable? The goal in any case is to
change household behavior by encouraging people to think rationally as people would do in
market societies rather than as they have traditionally thought about such matters, and thereby
transform non-market behavior into market behavior. In principle, then, because non-market
behavior is extensive in developing economy societies, there are many opportunities for choice
architects to demonstrate how nudge initiatives might provide effective policy strategies. In
effect, the heuristics and biases program, originally framed in psychological terms for developed
economies is then re-framed in more anthropological terms for developing economy societies.
How do Sunstein’s arguments bear on this? Sunstein’s arguments of course are formulated for
developed economy societies, not the developing world, as demonstrated by the fact that his
default rules are conceived of as expanding people’s freedom in connection with their existing
participation in markets. Thus, encouraging people to be rational by adopting default rules for
having others choose for them is a matter of replacing one set of market relationships – where
one makes one’s own choices – with another set of market relationships – where one has others
make one’s choices. But the application of default rules in developing economy societies where
much behavior is non-market behavior plays a different role. In this case, when people adopt
default rules to have others choose for them this may be a matter of replacing traditional social
relationships – where one either makes one’s own choices or allows others to make those choices
for customary reasons – with market relationships. That is, the default involved is a default from
traditional behaviors to market behaviors. In the bed nets case, decision-making regarding their
use generally reflects long-standing relationships within households, particularly involving
customary practices and the gender division of labor. Changing the use of bed nets by establishing
new defaults in terms of how people respond to market prices for bed nets is consequently a
matter of substituting new household social relationships tied to the market for existing ones that
evolved largely independently of the market.
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From this perspective, applying nudge policies in developing economy societies is pre-eminently
a normative project that promotes the particular conception of freedom Sunstein employs at the
expense of existing ethical values in those societies. For example, in traditional households many
decisions involving defaults that determine who will make choices for the household reflect
prevailing conceptions of fairness and individual dignity. These values are then de-emphasized
in the interest of increasing household freedom as Sunstein understands it through greater
participation in the market. If imperialism is fundamentally a matter of displacing one set of
practices, whether in science or life, by another, then in this instance a behavioral development
economics is a normative kind of imperialism associated with behavioral economics’ specific
normative vision. But this aspect of behavioral development economics imperialism, under
economics’ conception of itself as a positive science, mostly goes unacknowledged, except perhaps
by those who are encouraged by nudges and defaults to abandon their traditional forms of
behavior.

5

Economics’ status and relation to the other social sciences

I close with a discussion of an issue closely related to economics imperialism: economics’ status
and relation to the other social sciences. A key premise of economics imperialism as traditionally
understood, I argued, has been that economics maintains a clear line between science and ethics
which other social sciences have generally failed to observe. Economics has accordingly been
regarded by many economists as a more objective social science, and this has been a main
argument justifying economics imperialism and the export of its ideas and methods to other social
sciences (Hirshleifer, 1985; Lazear, 2000). Yet the argument above was that economics only pays
lip service to Robbins’ divide between science and ethics, and in fact is actively engaged in
promoting value-laden explanations rather than value-free ones. This then raises a question
regarding economics’ actual relation to the other social sciences. On the one hand, if economics
is value-laden just as it believes other social sciences are value-laden, then the traditional view
regarding its superiority as a social science is mistaken. On the other hand, if the social sciences
are generally value-laden, though presumably in different ways, then economics’ relation to the
other social sciences needs to be re-explained in terms of which values they respectively employ
and how they employ values and make value-laden explanations. Let me then narrow this large
issue down to just behavioral economics.
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Behavioral economics is an interesting case because it is the product of psychology’s influence on
economics – a reverse imperialism – and is thus a hybrid field in economics and social science.
My argument above was that its claim that standard rational choice theory is descriptively
inadequate really means it is normatively inadequate because rational choice theory’s
explanations of behavior fail to adequately explain freedom of choice. This then suggests that the
Kahneman-Tversky individual psychology from which behavioral economics is drawn is also
value-laden in a similar way, namely, that the heuristics and biases program has as an underlying
normative theme that individuals’ freedom is constrained by their psychological weaknesses. I
will not defend this conclusion beyond what I have said above about behavioral economics
counterfactual reasoning since it would require a thorough examination of that research program.
Rather I will only comment on what it would imply about economics’ relation to other social
sciences were it true that the Kahneman-Tversky research program makes a conception of
freedom central to its explanations of behavior.
Let me note, then, that psychology’s reverse imperialism towards economics raises an issue
sometimes neglected in discussions of economics imperialism. Often the focus of the latter is the
economics’ promotion of its conception of social science without much attention to economics’
degree of success in its reception elsewhere in social science.

In contrast, in the case of

psychology’s reverse imperialism towards economics the focus has rather rested on psychology’s
successful reception in economics as reflected in its undeniable influence on many economists.
Psychology also, we should note, appears to be relatively unique among the social sciences in this
regard, and this invites us to ask what has made its reception successful where other social
sciences have not been. My answer to this question should already be clear from the discussion
above. Psychology in the Kahneman-Tversky research program and standard rational choice
theory, despite their considerable differences, share a very similar value basis in their concern
with freedom of choice. Other social sciences, which have had less influence on economics, can
accordingly be judged to have been less successful in this regard because they have lacked this
close match in their value orientations with economics.
This suggests, then, a different view of the relative autonomy of the social sciences and economics’
relation to the other social sciences than many may hold. That is, if it is conventionally thought
that what accounts for the relative autonomy of the social sciences from one another are their
different subject matters and correspondingly different methods and concepts, then what the
increasingly close connection between economics and psychology seems to indicate is that the
relative autonomy of the social sciences depends more on the relative autonomy of their different
value assumptions. Economics and psychology, though they of course differ significantly in their
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methods and concepts, nonetheless appear to exhibit less autonomy from one another than they
each do from the other social sciences because of their shared normative foundations. They are
each concerned with the nature of individual freedom, albeit in somewhat different types of
circumstances. If this conclusion is correct, then it goes some distance to explaining the still
basically unexplained question of when are other social sciences likely to influence economics.
The answer to the question, then, is they are only likely to influence economics when the value
foundations they promote are close to the values that economics promotes.
I leave this discussion here, and make one final remark. One goal of this paper was to demonstrate
how behavioral economics offers a different but related understanding of freedom as exists in
standard rational choice theory – indeed one that can be taken to be both descriptively and
normatively superior. Thus economics’ identity and standing as a relatively autonomous social
science appears to depend on what happens regarding how people judge the debate over what
freedom involves. That is, if the conception of freedom that Sunstein and others defend becomes
increasingly reflective of how people in society understand freedom, then psychology’s influence
on economics is likely to strengthen, and behavioral economics is likely to become increasingly
dominant in how economists think about choice behavior. I do not offer any predictions for the
future on this score. They would require considerable speculation about the direction of modern
society. But I will say that this debate will likely be influenced by books such as Sunstein’s and by
the likelihood that one of the important on-going ethical debates in society will be over the scope
and nature of individual freedom.
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